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ABSTRACT
Mobile ad hoc networks have inherently different prop-
erties than traditional wired networks. These new char-
acteristics present different security vulnerabilities and
this paper provides a detailed classification of these
threats. Threats exist to a mobile ad hoc network both
from external nodes unauthorised to participate in the
mobile ad hoc networks, and from internal nodes, which
have the authorisation credentials to participate in the
mobile ad hoc network. Internal nodes giving rise to
threats can be further divided according to their be-
haviour — failed, badly failed, selfish and malicious
nodes. Failed and selfish nodes are those which do
not perform certain operations that the protocol spec-
ifies that they should, the former due to some unfore-
seen failure and the latter due to selfishness to conserve
power. Badly failed nodes may perform operations in-
correctly, introducing false and misleading information
into the network. Malicious nodes may deliberately dis-
rupt the network using a variety of attacks. All cat-
egories of node behaviour should be considered when
designing protocols for mobile ad hoc networks.
1. INTRODUCTION
Mobile ad hoc networks have inherently very different
properties than conventional networks. A lack of infras-
tructure presents problems with centrally controlled se-
curity, for example access control, which is traditionally
maintained by a central server. Also, security mecha-
nisms involving trusted third parties may no longer be
viable in ad hoc networks. As nodes may be mobile,
entering and leaving the network, a dynamic topology
means that security will have to be scalable. Commu-
nication is likely to be wireless, so bandwidth will be
limited. An even more important constraint is energy.
This introduces issues with heterogenous networking,
where resource intensive security mechanisms may not
work in an ad hoc environment.
This paper concentrates on presenting a general threat
model for mobile ad hoc networks which classifies the
different behaviours of mobile ad hoc nodes into ex-
ternal threats by unauthorized entities, and internal
threats posed by trusted entities. One of the key re-
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search areas in mobile ad hoc networks is setting up
and maintaining the ad hoc infrastructure through the
use of routing protocols. Existing protocols are likely to
be too resource intensive to be suitable for ad hoc net-
work use, so many solutions using a variety of different
methods are currently the subject of ongoing research.
This paper will use routing protocols as an example to
demonstrate the threat model.
Section 2 covers the terminology used. Section 3 gives
generic descriptions of the different types of routing pro-
tocols that have been proposed. Section 4 describes the
threat model, after defining some general security re-
quirements. Sections 5 and 6 classify the possible ex-
ternal and internal threats. Finally, section 7 comments
on scenarios for simulations of mobile ad hoc networks.
2. TERMINOLOGY
The following terms are used in this document, but
may be used differently elsewhere. A node is a device
with a network interface that is participating in rout-
ing in a mobile ad hoc network. It may or may not be
mobile, and may also be part of another network. It is
important to realise that a node can actually be a large
network, or it could be just a single mobile device such
as a mobile phone. An originator node is a node which
originates a data packet, intended for a certain destina-
tion node. A node is a neighbour node of another node
if it is only one hop away and within direct transmis-
sion range. If the destination node is not a neighbour
node of the originator node, the data packet will have
to traverse a multi-hop route consisting of intermediate
nodes. In a specific scenario, the sending node is the
last node to have forwarded the data packet. A routing
packet is any packet used by a routing protocol to af-
fect routing information. Examples include routing up-
dates, periodic neighbour beacons, route requests, route
replies and route error messages. Route request, reply
and error packets are used in reactive protocols. See
Section 3 for details of how these routing packets are
used.
A Source route/Route record is a sequential list of
node addresses from the originator node to the destina-
tion node, and is used in the Dynamic Source Routing
protocol (DSR) [9, p140]. In the context of sending data
packets along a route, the Forward Path is the (down-
stream) route from originator node to destination node.
Conversely, the Reverse Path is the (upstream) route
from the destination to originator node.
3. MOBILE AD HOC ROUTING
Routing is a major area of research in ad hoc net-
works, as the characteristics of ad hoc networks pose
many new challenges by comparison with traditional
wired area networks. Existing protocols are likely to
be too resource intensive to be suitable for ad hoc use,
so many solutions using a variety of methods are be-
ing proposed and studied. The Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF) has set up a working group called
MANET1, with the objective of selecting the most suit-
able protocols2. There are two main types of ad hoc
network routing protocols, pro-active and reactive pro-
tocols. Within these categories, different implementa-
tions use a variety of techniques to find and maintain
routes. Most routing protocols are table-driven, where
information is processed and stored in routing tables,
but other novel methods have been proposed.
Reactive protocol operation is typically divided into
a route discovery cycle and route maintenance. A node
initiates route discovery when it needs to send a data
packet to a destination whose route is unknown. This
typically involves broadcasting some form of route re-
quest message, where an intermediate or the destina-
tion node itself can provide the originator node with a
reply, containing the route to the destination. Route
maintenance is required as there are no periodic route
update messages. Instead, when a link break is de-
tected between two nodes, one or both nodes are re-
sponsible for propagating error information about the
broken link to all affected parties. Examples of reactive
routing schemes are the Ad hoc On-Demand Distance
Vector (AODV)3 protocol [12]; Dynamic Source Rout-
ing (DSR)3 [9], which uses ‘source routes’ and finally,
Location Aided Routing (LAR) [14] which is a location
assisted protocol, using geographical coordinates to in-
crease the efficiency of routing.
Pro-active protocols use periodic topology updates
to disseminate route information throughout the whole
network, but try to minimise the information being sent
in order to save bandwidth. Various techniques are used
to achieve this, as exemplified by Optimised Link State
Routing (OLSR) [3] and Topology Broadcast Reverse
Path Forwarding (TBRFP)3 [1].
Hybrid routing protocols use both pro and reactive
techniques to control a hierarchical architecture. The
Zone Routing Protocol ZRP3 [5, 6] is a hybrid pro-
tocol which actually combines three sub-protocols —
the Interzone Routing Protocol (IERP)3, the Intrazone
Routing Protocol (IARP)3 and the Broadcast Resolu-
tion Protocol (BRP)2.
Other hierarchical protocols have been proposed which
function on top of another routing protocol. Both Fish-
eye State Routing (FSR)3 [11] and Landmark Routing
(LANMAR)3 [4] attempt to introduce optimisations by
organising an implicit hierarchy on top of a proactive
routing protocol.
4. THE ROUTING THREAT MODEL
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This section describes the threat model for ad hoc
networks. Section 4.1 defines the security services which
are covered in the threat model, before sections 5 and
6 elaborate on how ad hoc nodes can behave.
4.1 Ad Hoc Network Routing Threats
The main threats to an ad hoc network routing pro-
tocol are as follows. This list also provides the basis for
a generic list of security requirements.
• Confidentiality. The primary confidentiality threat
in the context of routing protocols is to the privacy
of the routing information itself, which leads to a
secondary privacy threat to information such as
the network topology, geographical location, etc.
• Integrity. The integrity of a network depends on
all nodes in the network following correct routing
procedures so that every node has correct rout-
ing information. Therefore threats to integrity are
those which either introduce incorrect routing in-
formation or alter existing information.
• Availability. This is defined as access to routing
information at all times upon demand. If a route
exists to a mobile node, then any node should be
able to get that route when they require it. Also
a routing operation should not take an excessive
amount of time to perform, delaying a node from
receiving up-to-date route information. Related
to this, a node should be able to carry out normal
operations without excessive interference caused
by the routing protocol or security.
• Authorisation. An unauthorised node is one which
is not allowed to have access to routing informa-
tion, and is not authorised to participate in the ad
hoc routing protocol. There is no assumption that
there is an explicit and formal protocol, simply
an abstract notion of authorisation. However, as
discussed below, formal identity authentication is
a very important security requirement, needed to
provide access control services within the ad hoc
network.
• Dependability and reliability. One of the most com-
mon applications for ad hoc networks is in emer-
gency situations when the use of wired infrastruc-
ture is infeasible. Hence, routing must be reli-
able, and emergency procedures may be required.
For example, if a routing table becomes full due
to memory constraints, a reactive protocol should
still be able to find an emergency route to a given
destination.
• Accountability. This will be required so that any
actions affecting security can be selectively logged
and protected, allowing for appropriate reaction
against attacks. As explained below, the misbe-
haviours demonstrated by different types of nodes
will need to be detected, if not prevented. Event
logging will also help provide non-repudiation, pre-
venting a node from repudiating involvement in a
security violation.
4.2 Internal and External Threats
The threat model used here distinguishes between ex-
ternal and internal attacks — see also [16, p.25]. Ex-
ternal attacks are performed by unauthorised nodes or
entities. These threats are likely to be more easily de-
tected than threats from internal nodes. Internal at-
tacks are posed by internal nodes, i.e. they are per-
formed by authorised nodes within the ad hoc network.
These threats are thus likely to be more difficult to de-
tect as they arise from trusted sources.
In the text below, ‘correct’ data packets and ‘cor-
rect’ procedures are simply those that adhere strictly
to the routing protocol being used. By contrast ‘incor-
rect’ data packets and ‘incorrect’ procedures are those
which are in any way different to the format and be-
haviour as stated in the protocol. ‘False’ data packets
are data packets that are of the correct protocol format,
but contain false information.
5. EXTERNAL THREATS
In the presence of an authentication protocol to pro-
tect the upper layers, external threats are directed at
the physical and data link layers. Physical layer security
is intrinsically difficult to provide due to the possibly
mobile nature of ad hoc nodes.
We divide external threats into two major categories:
passive eavesdropping, where the adversary simply lis-
tens to transmitted signals, and active interference, where
the opponent sends signals or data designed to disrupt
the network in some way.
5.0.1 Passive eavesdropping
This can allow unauthorised principals to listen to
and receive messages including routing updates. An
unauthorised node will be able to gather data that can
be used to infer the network topology, and other infor-
mation such as the identities of the more heavily used
nodes which forward or receive data. Hence, techniques
may be needed to hide such information. Eavesdrop-
ping is also a threat to location privacy. Note that
passive eavesdropping also allows unauthorised nodes
to discover that a network actually exists within a geo-
graphical location, by just detecting that there is a sig-
nal present. Traffic engineering techniques have been
developed to combat this.
5.0.2 Active Interference
The major threat from active interference is a denial
of service attack caused by blocking the wireless com-
munication channel, or distorting communications. The
effects of such attacks depend on their duration, and
the routing protocol in use. With regard to the routing
of data packets, reactive routing protocols may see a
denial of service attack as a link break. Route mainte-
nance operations will cause most protocols to report the
link as broken so that participating nodes can find an
alternative route. Proactive routing protocols do not
react immediately to non-delivery of data packets. If
the route is believed to be broken, it will eventually be
timed out and deleted.
Probably the most serious type of denial of service at-
tack is a sleep deprivation torture attack [13, p4], where
node energy is deliberately wasted. With limited power
and resources, prevention of such attacks is of utmost
importance. Security against such attacks has already
been extensively studied and developed by the military
for packet radio networks. Spread spectrum technology
is designed to be resistant to noise, interference, jam-
ming, and unauthorized intrusion [7].
It is prudent to note that protection against sleep
deprivation torture cannot be achieved at the physical
layer, even though power constraint is indeed a physical
layer attribute. The fact that power levels affect all ad
hoc network operations makes securing such networks
particularly difficult.
There are also threats to integrity, e.g. where an ex-
ternal attacker can attempt to replay old messages, or
change the order of messages. Old messages may be re-
played to reintroduce out-of-date information. Out-of-
date routing information could lead to further denial of
service attacks as nodes try to use old but invalid routes,
or delete current valid routes. If the routing protocol
utilises neighbour sensing by monitoring received data
packets, replaying old packets may falsely lead nodes
into believing that an ‘old’ link with a neighbour has
become active and usable again.
6. INTERNAL THREATS
The threats posed by internal nodes are very serious,
as internal nodes will have the necessary information
to participate in distributed operations. Internal nodes
can misbehave in a variety of different ways; we identify
four categories of misbehaviour — failed nodes, badly
failed nodes, selfish nodes and malicious nodes.
Note that two misbehaving nodes within the same
category may exhibit different degrees of incorrect node
behaviour. For example, some nodes will be more selfish
than others. Also, a node may demonstrate behaviours
from more than one category — indeed, this may even
be the typical case.
6.1 Failed Nodes
Failed nodes are simply those unable to perform an
operation; this could be for many reasons, including
power failure and environmental events. The main is-
sues for ad hoc routing are failing to update data struc-
tures, or the failure to send or forward data packets,
including routing messages. This is important as those
data packets may contain important information per-
taining to security, such as authentication data and
routing information. A failure to forward route error
messages will mean that originator nodes will not learn
of broken links and continue to try to use them, cre-
ating bottlenecks. The threat of having failed nodes is
most serious if failed nodes are needed as part of an
emergency route, or form part of a secure route.
6.2 Badly Failed Nodes
Badly failed nodes exhibit features of failed nodes
such as not sending or forwarding data packets or route
messages. In addition they can also send false rout-
ing messages, which are still correctly formatted, but
which contain false information and are a threat to the
integrity of the network. For example, false route re-
quests for a node which does not exist may circulate in
the ad hoc network using up valuable bandwidth, as no
node can provide a suitable reply. Unnecessary route re-
quests for routes which badly failed nodes already have,
might also be sent. False route replies in response to a
true route request may result in false routes being set up
and being propagated through the network. False route
error messages will cause working links to be marked as
broken, potentially initiating a route maintenance pro-
cedure.
Protocols which rely on neighbour sensing operations
are also vulnerable, as false messages may cause nodes
to ‘sense’ extra neighbours. This is especially true in
protocols such as LANMAR, which do not rely on a
specific neighbour sensing message, but if a routing con-
trol message is received directly which contains an un-
known source address, then that address is used as a
new neighbour [4, p2].
Protocols such as AODV include within the route er-
ror messages a list of affected nodes to which the route
errors should be unicast [12, p211]. If this list is large,
then the threat not only affects network integrity, but
is also a denial of service attack, as resources and band-
width are being used up by the large volume of route
error messages sent, and the unnecessary route requests
and replies used to find alternative routes.
6.3 Selfish Nodes
Selfish nodes exploit the routing protocol to their
own advantage, e.g. to enhance performance or save
resources. Selfish nodes are typified by their unwill-
ingness to cooperate as the protocol requires whenever
there is a personal cost involved, and will exhibit the
same behaviours as failed nodes, depending on what
operations they decide not to perform. Packet drop-
ping is the main attack by selfish nodes, where most
routing protocols have no mechanism to detect whether
data packets have been forwarded, DSR being the only
exception [9]. Thus, another pattern of behaviour to
consider is partial dropping, which could be difficult to
prevent and detect. It is important to emphasise that,
in this model, selfish nodes do not perform any action
to compromise network integrity by actively introduc-
ing incorrect information.
6.4 Malicious Nodes
Malicious nodes aim to deliberately disrupt the cor-
rect operation of the routing protocol, denying network
services if possible. Hence, they may display any of the
behaviours shown by the other types of failed nodes.
The impact of a malicious node’s actions is greatly in-
creased if it is the only link between groups of neigh-
bouring nodes.
6.4.1 Denial of Service Attacks
The most common threats lead to a denial of service
attack, which in turn induces the ‘sleep deprivation tor-
ture’ attack [13, p4]. Malicious nodes cause other nodes
to exhaust their resources by getting other mobile nodes
to do unnecessary processing using correct or incorrect
information. Those nodes which use up their power re-
sources will eventually become unable to operate under
normal circumstances. A sleep deprivation torture at-
tack is particularly viable for ad hoc networks, due to
the power constraints likely for mobile nodes. There are
a variety of ways to achieve the objective of this denial
of service attack. For example, in proactive protocols a
malicious node could advertise topology updates with
lots of false routes and addresses so that the route table
calculation will take more time and resource. This is
also an attack on network integrity.
6.4.2 Attacks on Network Integrity
Many denial of service attacks are also threats to net-
work integrity, exploiting the routing protocol to intro-
duce incorrect routing information. Another factor is
that the more densely populated is the area in which a
malicious node attacks, the more nodes will be affected.
Protocols such as OLSR use a pure flooding mechanism
so false information will be relayed to every node [3, p4].
With the hierarchical FSR protocol, participating nodes
far away from the malicious node will be less sensitive to
its injected false information, especially in a multi-scope
implementation [11, p2]. Hence, the preferred environ-
ment for a malicious node in a FSR controlled network
is to have few scopes of a large size, to make sure false
information is periodically broadcast as often and to as
many nodes as possible.
6.4.3 Attacking Neighbour Sensing Protocols
Malicious nodes can either force nodes to incorrectly
add neighbours when they do not exist, or cause nodes
to ignore valid neighbour nodes. The method will de-
pend on the neighbour sensing protocol but most re-
quire the receipt of some form of message. As with a
badly failed node, a malicious node can send a neigh-
bour sensing message with a false source address to
cause the same effects.
For a malicious node to cause another node to ig-
nore its neighbours, it could perform an active denial of
service attack similar to external nodes. However, this
could also be easily detected. Thus, this attack will be
more successful for the malicious node if it could ex-
ploit some other operation such as a blacklist. If a bi-
directional MAC4 protocol is in use, DSR uses a black-
list for neighbours a node believes it has asymmetrical
links with [9]. Thus, a malicious node could just try to
block transmission in one direction to cause the node to
be added to its blacklist. Blacklisted entries either ex-
pire or are deleted when bi-directional communication
has been confirmed. So, conversely, a malicious node
could try to force a node to delete neighbours from its
blacklist by masquerading as a blacklisted node, and
forward a route request, whose source header contains
details of the blacklisted node (its IP address etc.). A
similar attack can be achieved with AODV [12].
6.4.4 Misdirecting Traffic
As previously mentioned, a malicious node can usu-
ally masquerade by just using a false source address in
the data packets it sends, as described in FSR [11]. In
FSR, nodes examine the IP Header source address and
use it as a neighbour address. If the malicious node uses
a false address which belongs to another node, then it
can affect network integrity by getting all nodes in the
network to point their routes to the malicious node,
instead of the true owner of the source address. A ma-
licious node can do this in a reactive protocol by reply-
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ing to route requests before the original owner can, and
the same effect can be achieved in a proactive protocol
where the malicious node just advertises false routes in
the hope they get accepted before the true routes. The
malicious node will then receive any information which
was intended for the owner of the address. This attack
has been named the ‘black hole’ attack [10, p4], akin
to the celestial structure which sucks in all objects and
matter.
Another reason for masquerading in this way is when
the malicious node targets another node and cause ex-
cess traffic to be routed to it, causing a targeted sleep
deprivation attack. A malicious node could send false
route requests on behalf of this node, so that other
nodes will then direct route replies to the node. Ma-
licious nodes can advertise routes with attractive route
metrics and high sequence number so that the likelihood
of the false route being accepted is increased. However,
the further away a malicious node is, the less successful
this attack will be in getting the false routes accepted
before the true routes.
However, as identified and addressed by [8, p2], an-
other attack exists to cause a similar effect. In the
‘Wormhole’ attack, a malicious node tunnels packets.
In a reactive routing network, tunnelling route requests
close to the destination node will result in the tunnelled
route being replied to, and all other route requests be-
ing ignored. Thus the malicious node has injected itself
into the route. In a proactive routing network, the same
technique can be used to tunnel neighbour sensing mes-
sages, in order to attack neighbour sensing protocols as
described above.
6.4.5 Exploiting Route Maintenance
Malicious nodes can simply propagate false route er-
ror messages so that valid working links are marked as
broken. Resources will be used in attempts to repair
the links or find alternative routes. An alternative at-
tack may be for a malicious node to coerce another node
into sending route error messages by blocking an oper-
ational link (e.g. by blocking acknowledgments in DSR
[9, p147]). This attack can also be performed by an
external attacker.
6.4.6 Attacking Sequence Numbers and Duplicate
Mechanism
Unique sequence numbers prevent replay attacks of
old data packets. However, this mechanism can also
be exploited to cause a denial of service. A malicious
node could flood the network with as many messages
with false source addresses containing as many high se-
quence numbers as possible. Thus any true messages
sent will be discarded as duplicated or out of sequence.
This attack is possible because most protocols require
nodes to maintain their own sequence number counter,
and do not take into account the sequence numbers of
received messages. Note that this discussion refers to
message identifier sequence numbers and not the se-
quence numbers used to guarantee route freshness as in
AODV and OLSR.
6.4.7 Attacks on Protocol Specific Optimisations
There are many protocol specific attacks. The fol-
lowing describes an attack on the DSR salvaging opera-
tion which is used to find alternative routes when a link
break is detected [9, p151].
Using the attacks just described above, the malicious
node injects into the network as many routes, with as
many different next hops, as possible, all of which do
not exist and all point to the same target. The mali-
cious node then sends a data packet addressed for that
non-existent target. This is a denial of service attack
as an intermediate node will now attempt to send route
error messages for each next-hop from which it tries to
gain an acknowledgement. The intermediate node then
tries to salvage the data packet by finding an alterna-
tive route. The alternative route is likely to be another
false route and this carries on until the data packet
has been the subject of MAX SALVAGE TIMES sal-
vage attempts. Of course the malicious node can just
send a data packet for the same target to repeat the
denial of service.
7. PROTOCOL, MECHANISM AND
SIMULATION DESIGN ISSUES
A motivation for this threat model is to produce more
realistic scenarios and simulations, in order to properly
test security mechanisms designed to cope with all the
different types of node behaviour, producing feasible
solutions which will work in a real and practical sys-
tem. Early simulations of ad hoc networks have often
been too ‘clean’ or ‘vanilla’ where the system runs too
smoothly and uniformly. Network topology has a ma-
jor impact on the effect of the realisation of threats.
Thus the following properties affect the possible threats
identified in the threat model, and should be considered
when designing secure protocols and simulation studies
to test such protocols.
• Size. It is a prerequisite that the network size
should be changeable. Indeed, size should be made
a dynamic variable which changes as nodes enter
and leave the ad hoc network. Simulations should
ideally also cover the case where large numbers of
nodes simultaneously enter or leave the network.
• Density of nodes. Denial of service threats will be
more difficult to achieve in crowded than sparsely
populated areas. The simple reason is that the
more nodes there are, the more possible alternative
routes exist. However, threats to network integrity
may be more serious in dense areas as any false
information will propagate faster.
• Position of nodes. This describes the problem of
nodes which drift in and out of transmission range
of the ad hoc network at the perimeter, and also
any partitioning where only a few nodes link two
groups of nodes. Here the perimeter of the net-
work may be the actual physical perimeter, or the
logical perimeter of a collection of network nodes
which are cooperating with each other. Denial of
service threats are more serious here, as boundary
nodes will have fewer routes to the rest of the ad
hoc network. In both scenarios, there are fewer
routes to attack to perform a successful a denial
of service attack.
• Grouping. Allied to the position of nodes should
be some means of simulating the grouping of nodes.
The property of locality of reference refers to the
fact that nodes will communicate with a common
group of nodes, often those closest to it. In any
case, scalability will probably see ad hoc routing
using some form of hierarchical model, as with
the Internet. Grouping may be temporary with
a high number of nodes leaving and joining (e.g.
a hotspot location), or quite permanent (e.g. a
Personal Area Network).
• Mobility. It has to be emphasised that not all ad
hoc nodes have to be mobile. Therefore, proto-
cols and their simulations should include station-
ary nodes. In terms of practicality, research may
reveal that ad hoc networks may not be able to
function without some semi-central entities any-
way. Thus the number of stationary nodes should
be an automatically dynamic variable. When sim-
ulating mobile nodes, care must be taken to make
their movement random [15]. Their speed should
not be constant and their movement made of dif-
ferent curves and lines. Elucidating the previous
design point, groups of nodes will also move to-
gether, for example nodes in a car. Since some
nodes may move very quickly, protocols will have
to cope with nodes entering and leaving at a high
rate. For example, nodes belonging to people and
shops in a street may want to network together
and share services as they know there will be some
link persistence. They may however, wish to ig-
nore nodes in a car which drives past as the re-
lationship will not be long-lasting enough for any
practical benefit to result.
• Relationships. Most current simulations include a
node randomly sending another node a data packet
or route request. Although this may be too com-
plicated to implement, simulations should ideally
include relationships of differing length. Short term
relationships of seconds and long term relation-
ships of many minutes should both be covered.
The motivation for this arises from recent repu-
tation research [2]. The differing lengths of rela-
tionships can dictate how good or bad reputations
will be considered and managed.
8. CONCLUSION
Mobile ad hoc networks present different threats due
to their very different properties. These properties open
up very different security risks from conventional wired
networks, and each of them affects how security is pro-
vided and maintained. All four types of internal threat
identified above give rise to different security require-
ments, several of which apply to ad hoc routing. Any
protocols and simulations to test them should include
the capability to handle each type of node and attack.
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